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INTRODUCTION 
The Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) is the world's leading 
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the most powerful organizations in contemporary athletics. 1 Much of the 
sport's popularity in the United States can be attributed to the UFC, and 
most fighters would give almost anything to earn a contract to professional-
ly fight for the company.2 As a result, the UFC has gained enough power to 
be highly selective and only sign contracts with fighters who are willing to 
sacrifice for the company, both inside and outside of the octagon.3 
For instance, Jon Fitch, a successful fighter, had two fights remaining 
on his UFC contract when the promotion company dropped him for refusing 
to sign a lifetime Exclusive Promotional and Ancillary Rights Agreement 
(Ancillary Rights Agreement).4 The purpose of the Ancillary Rights 
Agreement was to allow the UFC to use Fitch's name and likeness in an 
upcoming video game.5 Additionally, the lifetime agreement prevented 
Fitch from ever working with another video game company, regardless of 
whether or not he still held a professional fighting contract with the UFC.6 
In return, Fitch would not have received any additional compensation other 
than '"free publicity and promotion. "'7 
Fitch had virtually no contractual bargaining power, and the UFC im-
mediately dismissed his attempts to negotiate for a shorter term.8 After his 
contract was terminated, Fitch asserted that he was not upset about the lack 
of compensation or the inability to work with another video game compa-
ny.9 Rather, he believed the most outrageous aspect of the situation was the 
coercive way in which the UFC presented the agreement for his signature, 
demanding that Fitch take the contract or lose his remaining fights in the 
I. The UFC, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc/index (last visited Oct. 5, 
2012). 
2. See Stan Leung, Big Brother Is the UFC: Jon Fitch Cut from His UFC Contract, 
FIGHTING-MMA, http://www.fighting-mma.com/articles/2008/big-brother-is-the-ufc.php 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
3. /d. The "octagon" is the caged "eight-sided specially-designed structure where 
all UFC bouts take place." Glossary, UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/glossary/list#O (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
4. See Leung, supra note 2; Kevin Io1e, UFC Drops Fitch, AKA Fighters, YAHOO! 
SPORTS (Nov. 20, 2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/mma!news?slug=ki-ufcakafeud 111908; see 
also Kris Graft, UFC's Fitch Talks Contract Dispute, EDGE (Nov. 21, 2008, 10:47 PM), 
http://www.next-gen.biz/features/ufcs-fitch-talks-contract-dispute. 
5. See Graft, supra note 4. 
6. Greg Savage, Update: UFC Talking with Fitch's Management, SHERDOG (Nov. 
20, 2008), http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/Update-UFC-Talking-with-Fitchs-
Management-15235; see also Iole, supra note 4 ('"We could die and they could make memo-
rial figurines and stuff and make thousands, millions of dollars, and our families wouldn't 
see a penny of it."' (quoting Jon Fitch)). 
7. Savage, supra note 6 (quoting Jon Fitch). 
8. Iole, supra note 4 ("'We tried to negotiate five- or [ten]-year deals with them, 
but it wasn't good enough. It was all or nothing. He wanted our lifetime. He wanted our souls 
forever."' (quoting Jon Fitch)). 
9. See id. 
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UFC. 10 Feeling powerless and disrespected, Fitch refused to sign the life-
time agreement.•• The UFC immediately dropped him. 12 
Fitch was a well-known and successful fighter, 13 but UFC president 
Dana White made it clear that he was only willing to work with fighters 
who respected what he was trying to do for the company and for MMA. 14 
White believes that these fighters are indebted to him because he awarded 
contracts to fighters like Fitch when the economy provided virtually no oth-
er opportunities for amateur mixed martial artists. 15 As harsh a reality as it 
10. Savage, supra note 6 ('"They basically kicked the door open, guns blazing, 
pointed it in our face and said, "Sign this or you're going to pay."'" (quoting Jon Fitch)). 
11. I ole, supra note 4. 
12. !d. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. ('"There are a lot of guys who help us and work with us and are great part-
ners with us, and they're the ones we're going to remember and take care of."' (quoting Dana 
White)). 
15. /d. ('"Do these guys understand what is going on in this world? I'll tell you, this 
economy is [expletive] up. It's totally [expletive] up. It's bad, real, real bad .... It's a whole 
other world out there, believe me, and let these guys go out there and see what they find."' 
(alteration in original) (quoting Dana White)). For a perfect example of the problems Dana 
White was referring to, look at ex-UFC fighter War Machine's life. See generally War Ma-
chine Going Back to Jail for Another Year, UNDERGROUND, 
http://www.mixedmartialarts.com/news/382322/War-Machine-going-back-to-jail-for-
another-year (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). War Machine, formerly known as Jon Koppenhaver, 
legally changed his name in 2008 when a wrestling federation copyrighted the nickname and 
prohibited the UFC from using it. Nichole Freshna, UFC News: Jon Koppenhaver LegaJ/y 
Changes His Name to "War Machine," CAGE TODAY (Aug. 28, 2008), 
http://www.cagetoday.com/ufc-news-jon-koppenhaver-legally-changes-his-name-to-war-
machine. War Machine held a UFC record of one and one when he was released for refusing 
a fight and publicly making inappropriate comments regarding the death of a former fighter. 
Sam Caplan, Jon Koppenhaver Released by the UFC, FIVE OUNCES OF PAIN (Sept. 12, 2008, 
4:25 PM), http:/lfiveouncesofpain.com/2008/09/12/jon-koppenhaver-released-by-the-ufc. 
Following the end of his UFC career, War Machine had a brief stint in the adult film indus-
try, but he could not stay out of trouble with the law. Dann Stupp, Bellator Inks Polarizing 
Fighter War Machine, MMAJUNKIE.COM (Dec. 7, 2011, 10:00 PM), 
http://mmajunkie.com/news/ 26433/bellator-inks-polarizing-fighter-war-machine.mma. War 
Machine was arrested numerous times on battery-related charges. !d. The Las Vegas Police 
Department issued a warrant for his arrest when he was "accused of beating and choking his 
girlfriend" at a fellow adult-actress's birthday party. Warrant Issued for War Machine, 
UNDERGROUND, http://www.mixedmartialarts.com/news/203083/White-still-interested-in-
Nick-Diaz (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). Subsequently, War Machine was involved in other bar 
fights and was arrested in San Diego, California. Dana Littlefield, War Machine Headed for 
Stand Down in Jail, U-T SAN DIEGO (July 1, 2010, 4:33 PM), 
http://www. utsandiego.com/news/ 201 0/jul/0 1 /war-machine-headed-for-stand-down-in-jail. 
After the arrest, he "pleaded guilty to two felony counts of assault with force likely to cause 
great bodily injury." /d. As a result, War Machine was ordered to serve a year in county jail 
and was placed on three years' probation. Dana Littlefield, War Machine Gets Probation, 
Jail Time for Brawls, U-T SAN DIEGO (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:59 PM), 
http://wwww.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/aug/24/man-named-war-machine-gets-
probation-jail-time-bar. He was released in 2011, but found himself in front of a district court 
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may have been, Fitch recognized that he could not be a part of the world's 
largest MMA promotion company if he refused to agree to White's offer 
and sign the lifetime agreement. 16 A mere twenty-four hours after being 
dropped from the UFC, Fitch signed the lifetime agreement, and the UFC 
reinstated his contract. 17 
The UFC has earned so much market power since its creation in 1993 
that it can demand and obtain its preferred contract terms. 18 As illustrated by 
Fitch's contract dispute, the UFC consequently gains even more control 
over fighters once they sign a contract. 19 The current bargaining structure is 
not sustainable because it increases the likelihood of a revolt by fighters 
against the promotion company. If the fighters rebel against the promotion 
company, they would likely seek an appropriate standard of fairness regard-
ing contractual agreements between fighters and promoters.20 Based on the 
potential goals of the sport, there are different ways to achieve contract re-
form that will further legitimize and improve the overall quality of the 
sport.21 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of MMA and how the 
UFC's dominance led to such extreme disparities in bargaining power be-
tween fighters and the promotion company. Part II explains how different 
sports and industries have historically dealt with coercive contracts. Finally, 
Part III concludes by analyzing the various alternatives and then determin-
ing which option is most appropriate for MMA based on the most reasona-
ble amount of contract reform. 
judge for a sentencing hearing in early 2012. Matthew Roth, War Machine Sentencing Hear-
ing: Complete Transcript, BLOODY ELBOW (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:13 PM), 
http://www. bloodyelbow.com/20 12/2/ 13/2796238/war-machine-sentencing-hearing-
complete-transcript. The sentencing was for a similar bar fight that he was involved in where 
he sent a bouncer to the hospital. !d. War Machine went into the hearing prepared to take a 
plea bargain, which would have required him to pay the bouncer's $61,000 medical bill and 
extend his probation. /d. Instead, the judge explained that, as a trained fighter, War Machine 
is dangerous, and probation would not be acceptable. !d. Thus, War Machine was ordered to 
serve another year in prison. !d. 
16. See Damon Martin, 24 Hours Later: Jon Fitch Back with UFC, MMA WKLY. 
(Nov. 21, 2008), http://mmaweekly.com/24-hours-later-jon-fitch-back-with-ufc-2; Greg 
Savage, Fitch Back in UFC Fold, SHERDOG (Nov. 20, 2008), 
http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/Fitch-Back-in-UFC-Fold-15249; Savage, supra note 6. 
17. Martin, supra note 16; Savage, supra note 6. 
18. See I ole, supra note 4; The UFC, supra note I. 
19. See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
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I. HISTORY OF THE ULTIMATE COMBAT SPORT 
From its brutal past, MMA has evolved into one of the most popular 
contemporary spectator sports in the world.22 Once classified as a bloody 
display that resembled a street fight more than an organized sport, MMA is 
now a respected sport with professional fighters who are among the most 
elite athletes in the world.23 The modem-day roots of MMA reach far back 
to ancient Greek athletics, and from that time the sport has continued to 
evolve.24 
A. Origins of the Sport 
In 648 B.C., the Greek warrior class practiced a primitive sport called 
"pankration."25 Unlike the popular sport of wrestling, where the object was 
to throw the opponent, the object of pankration was to continue fighting 
"until one of the two pankratiasts acknowledge[ d) his defeat."26 Pankration 
fighters secured victories only when the other competitor became seriously 
injured or if he-raised his hand and admitted defeat. 27 Although fatal acci-
dents were rare, some of the competitions resulted in death. 28 Beginning in 
the thirty-third Olympiad and continuing for a millennium, pankration com-
petitions were a popular spectator event. 29 The event continued to grow in 
22. See The UFC, supra note I. 
23. See Brendan S. Maher, Understanding and Regulating the Sport of Mixed Mar-
tial Arts, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 209,216,227 (2010). 
24. See The UFC, supra note 1. 
25. E. Norman Gardiner, The Pankration and Wrestling, 26 J. HELLENIC STUD. 4, 4 
(1906); Jordan T. Smith, Fighting for Regulation: Mixed Martial Arts Legislation in the 
United States, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 617,620 (2010). 
26. Gardiner, supra note 25, at 4. Even this early form of MMA had its share of 
critics. !d. at 4-5. For example, the ancient Spartans were prohibited from competing in pank-
ration because the object was to make one of the pankratiasts admit defeat, but the Spartans 
considered it a disgrace to admit defeat in any fashion. !d. at 4. Further, the Spartans believed 
such a brutish and unregulated activity was meant to train for warfare, and it "was not fit for 
an athletic competition." !d. at 4-5. 
27. See id. at 7; Smith, supra note 25, at 620. Few rules were enforced during com-
petition, but an official was present to hit pankriasts with a stick if they bit, gouged eyes, or 
scratched their opponent. Smith, supra note 25, at 620. When a competitor was seriously 
injured, he was considered "'completely destroyed."' !d. (quoting I ANDREAS V. GEORGIOU, 
PANKRATION: AN OLYMPIC COMBAT SPORT, AN ILLUSTRATED RECONSTRUCTION 19-20 
(2005)). Often, a pankratiast "completely destroyed" his opponent by breaking an opponent's 
fingers, attempting to strangle an opponent to death, or twisting an opponent's ankle out of 
its socket. Gardiner, supra note 25, at 7. 
28. See Gardiner, supra note 25, at 12; Smith, supra note 25, at 620. 
29. Smith, supra note 25, at 620. 
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popularity until Roman Emperor Theodosius outlawed the Olympic Games 
in the fourth century.30 
The ancient form of fighting was disregarded until the 1920s, when a 
Brazilian form of mixed combat, known as vale tudo, resurrected interest in 
the ancient multidisciplinary competition.31 Vale tudo involved various 
fighting styles, including muy-thai kickboxing, luta livre wrestling, boxing, 
and a new discipline called Brazilian jiu-jitsu (BJJ).32 As venues regularly 
began to hold vale tudo matches, the new combat sport quickly became the 
second most popular sport in Brazil.33 Members of the Gracie family began 
practicing BJJ based on judo, a Japanese martial art, and they used the new 
discipline to dominate vale tudo events. 34 As a result of the success of both 
vale tudo and BJJ, Rorion Gracie moved to the United States in 1980 to 
promote his family's martial art.35 
B. Mixed Martial Arts in America 
Rorion Gracie taught BJJ in California until 1992 when he partnered 
with Art Davie and Bob Meyrowitz to establish the UFC.36 At first, the UFC 
hosted MMA tournaments to find the most dominant fighting discipline in 
the world.37 Similar to pankration and vale tudo, early UFC events had very 
few rules and lacked weight classes, time limits, rounds, or safety equip-
ment.38 Further, the UFC boasted about its "no-rules, anything-goes, judge-
free competitions," which resembled caged street fights rather than orga-
nized sporting events.39 
30. !d. 
31. See The UFC, supra note I. Vale tudo matches resembled those of ancient pank-
ration because they were unregulated and often resulted in serious injury to the competitors. 
See Smith, supra note 25, at 620; Donald F. Walter, Jr., Mixed Martial Arts: Ultimate Sport, 
or Ultimately Illegal?, GRAPPLEARTS (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.grapplearts.com/ Mixed-
Martiai-Arts-l.htm. 
32. Walter, supra note 31. 
33. !d. According to ticket sales in Brazil, the only sport more popular than vale 
tudo was, and still is, rutbol. !d. 
34. !d.; Smith, supra note 25, at 620. 
35. Walter, supra note 31. 
36. !d.; The UFC, supra note 1. 
37. See The UFC, supra note 1. 
38. Walter, supra note 31. 
39. Maher, supra note 23, at 216. The fighting tournaments were advertised as orga-
nized brawls that would showcase different fighting styles and determine which style was the 
most dominant. !d. The first event featured a match-up between a 425-pound amateur sumo 
wrestler and a 215-pound "savage" street fighter turned pro wrestler. Dave Meltzer, First 
UFC Forever Altered Combat Sports, YAHOO! SPORTS (Nov. 12, 2007), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/mmalnews?slug=dm-earlyufc 111207. The match ended thirty sec-
onds into the first round when the street fighter kicked the teeth out of the sumo wrestler's 
mouth and then went on to brutally punch his face using his bare knuckles. !d. 
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The new UFC tournaments quickly gained rapid success and became 
the most watched non-boxing Pay-Per-View sporting events in history.40 
Unfortunately, the UFC's growing popularity also attracted backlash when 
politicians and lawmakers reacted to the violent and bloody nature of the 
sport.41 Most notably, Senator John McCain of Arizona took the floor of the 
United States Senate in 1996, characterized the sport as '"human cock-
fighting,"' and urged the states to prohibit or ban the sport altogether.42 As a 
result, nearly all fifty states enacted laws to regulate the contests and to pre-
vent cable companies from broadcasting them, while thirty-six states 
banned the sport all together.43 
In 200 I, Zuffa, LLC bought the UFC for $2 million and began to im-
plement a set of unified rules and safety regulations designed to legitimize 
the sport and to save it from extinction.44 With newly established credibility, 
40. Meltzer, supra note 39. The fourth event resulted in 240,000 Pay-Per-View 
sales. /d. 
41. !d. A notorious VHS sleeve advertised that the event could be won by "knock-
out, submission, or death." !d. 
42. Smith, supra note 25, at 622 (quoting L. Jon Wertheim, The New Main Event, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 22, 2007, at 54). McCain also referred to the sport as a "visual 
feast of broken bones and blood." Health and Safety of Professional Boxing: Hearings Be-
fore the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 103d Cong. 68 (1994) (statement of Sen. 
McCain); see also Maher, supra note 23, at 217. 
43. See Smith, supra note 25, at 622; Maher, supra note 23, at 217; L. Jon 
Wertheim, The New Main Event, Sl.cOM (May 22, 2007, 9:11 AM), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/more/05/22/ultimate0528/index.html. 
44. Smith, supra note 25, at 622; The UFC, supra note I. Zuffa is the parent compa-
ny of the UFC. Dave Meltzer, Minority Interest Sold in UFC Parent Company, YAHOO! 
SPORTS (Jan. 12, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/mma/news?slug=dm-ufcsale011210. The 
parent company owns a number of fighting organizations in addition to the UFC, such as 
Strikeforce, World Extreme Cage Fighting, and PRIDE. UFC Purchases Strikeforce; UFC 
Boss Says Organizations to Operate Independently, MMAJUNKIE.COM (Mar. 12, 2011, 6:30 
PM), http://mmajunkie.com/news/22807/ufc-purchases-strikeforce.mma. Thus, fighters sign 
contracts with both Zuffa and whichever organization they will fight under. See Zu.ffa Insti-
tutes Pre-Contract Drug Screening for Performance Enhancers, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 17, 
2012, 3 :22 PM), http://sports. yahoo.corn/news/zuffa-institutes-pre-contract-drug-202246404-
-spt.html. Dana White, Frank Fertitta, and Lorenzo Fertitta created Zuffa upon purchasing 
the UFC, and it is the promotional company that handles all MMA business. FIGHTING 
POLITICS (Media Fly Creative 2010). White and the Fertitta brothers held a convention to 
establish a unified set of rules for the sport in an effort to urge states to legalize MMA once 
again. John Eligon, A Boxing Regulator Changes Corners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/sports/othersports/24fight.htrnl?pagewanted=all. The 
convention took place in New Jersey, and those in attendance included mixed martial arts 
experts, doctors, and regulators. !d. Unlike the early days of the UFC, an emphasis was 
placed on strict rules and safety standards in an effort to improve the sport's reputation and 
distance it from the original aggressive promotional efforts that boasted about the sport's 
"no-holds-barred" attitude. !d. Among the new rules were "rounds, time limits, five weight 
classes, a list of [thirty-one] fouls, and [eight] possible ways to win." Walter, supra note 31. 
As a result, the Nevada State Athletic Commission eventually sanctioned the sport. Maher, 
supra note 23, at 218. 
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many legislators and regulators recognized MMA as a legitimate sport that 
was actually safer than boxing.45 Currently, MMA is sanctioned in forty-five 
out of the forty-eight states that have sanctioning bodies.46 Despite the fact 
that MMA is not nationally sanctioned in the United States, the UFC can 
rightfully take credit for legitimizing the sport and increasing its popularity 
throughout the world.47 The UFC is now the world's leading promotion 
company for MMA and is the fastest growing sports organization in histo-
ry.4s 
C. The Coercive UFC Contract 
The UFC's monumental success has provided the promotion company 
with an enormous amount of bargaining power, unmatched by any fighter 
45. Wertheim, supra note 43. All fifty states either approved or reviewed the Uni-
fied Rules of Mixed Martial Arts through a sanctioning committee. !d. Dr. Margaret Good-
man, chairwoman of the Nevada State Athletic Commission's Medical Advisory Board 
expressed her opinion that MMA was safer than boxing because "[t]he guys [submit], and 
it's over. You don't have standing eight counts, you don't have [ten] rounds of guys taking 
shots to the head." !d. 
46. See Matt Flegenheimer, No Resolution for Mixed Martial Arts, N.Y. TIMES, June 
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/20 11106/27 /nyregionlobstacles-in-push-to-legalize-
mixed-martial-arts-in-new-york.html. New York, Connecticut, and Vermont are the only 
states that do not sanction MMA, while Alaska and Wyoming do not have sanctioning bod-
ies. !d. In 20 II, a bill to legalize the sport in New York passed the State Senate for the sec-
ond straight year, and for the second straight year the bill did not reach a vote before the 
Ways and Means committee. !d. 
47. See The UFC, supra note I. 
48. !d. Its event coverage is translated into twenty different languages and is broad-
casted to hundreds of millions of homes around the world in 149 countries and territories. !d. 
Every year the UFC produces thirty live events worldwide, twelve Pay-Per-View events, and 
the most successful and longest running sports reality television show "The Ultimate Fight-
er." Id The UFC is not the only MMA organization in the world. Riley Kontek, MMA 's Best 
Developmental Organizations, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http:/ /bleacherreport.com/articles/ I 064433mmas-best-developmental-organizations. Many 
second-tier organizations are used as starting points for fighters who hope to someday sign a 
contract with the UFC. See id. There are countless organizations both in the United States 
and around the world. MMA Organizations, MMA-CORE, http://www.mma-
core.com/organizations (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). While the UFC is the most dominant 
organization in America and most of the world, there are some Asian alternatives that may 
someday share comparable power. James Goyder, Which Organization Will Become the 
UFC of Asia?, BLEACHER REP. (July 20, 2011), http:/!bleacherreport.com/articles/773254-
which-mma-organization-is-set-to-be-the-ufc-of-asia. Still, Dana White asserts, "I have no 
MMA rivals." Sergio Non, MMA Power 10: It's a Zuffa World, USA TODAY, June 21,2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mma/2011-06-20-power-1 0 _ N.htm. Further, White states, 
"'My competition is the NFL. My competition is Major League Baseball. My competition is 
these other networks."' !d. (quoting Dana White). 
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regardless of his success or status. 49 As a result, fighters have little protec-
tion from coercive, one-sided contracts, which they must sign if they want 
to fight for the UFC. 50 The UFC has adopted a "my way or the highway" 
approach to signing fighters. 51 The standard form exclusive fighter agree-
ments heavily favor the UFC and Zuffa. 52 Fighters lack the essential bar-
gaining power to change the terms of their agreements because the UFC has 
a virtual monopoly on MMA contests, and there is an unlimited supply of 
talented fighters willing to accept the UFC's terms.53 
Exclusive fighter agreements contain a number of provisions that al-
low the promoter to control the contractual relationship.54 The general pro-
visions in these standard form contracts disadvantage the fighters and put 
the promoter in the best possible position.55 For instance, the exclusivity 
49. See generally Leland Roling, UFC Holds All the Power in Contract Negotia-
tions with Dan Henderson, BLOODY ELBOW (Sept. 15, 2011, 1:00PM), 
http://www. bloodyelbow.corn/20 11 /9/ 15/2426983/ufc-dan-henderson-ho Ids-all-the-power-
in-contract-negotiations. 
50. See Geoff Varney, Fighting for Respect: MMA 's Struggle for Acceptance and 
How the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Would Give It a Sporting Chance, 112 W. VA. 
L. REV. 269,299-300 (2009) (discussing how the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act would 
prevent one-sided contracts if the Act applied to MMA). President Dana White has stated 
that fighters must "get with the program" and accept the terms of the contract or forget about 
fighting for the UFC. I ole, supra note 4. 
51. Matt De La Rosa, Historic MMA Rivalries, Part Four: UFC vs. Fighters, 
BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 24, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/128714-historic-mma-
rivalries-part-4-ufc-vs-fighters (explaining that the UFC is the biggest promoter in MMA and 
has the "luxury" of running its business based completely on its own preferences). 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See Gary Wimsett, Promotions and the Use of Exclusive Fighter Agreements in 
MMA, FIVE OUNCES OF PAIN (May 19, 2009, 9:50 AM), 
http:l/fiveouncesofpain.corn/2009/05/19/promotions-and-the-use-of-exclusive-fighter-
agreements-in-mma. 
55. See Varney, supra note 50, at 300; Wimsett, supra note 54. For example, the 
promoter's business purpose is defined using broad terms that include general business prac-
tices and promotion ofMMA events. Jd. A common business purpose provision explains that 
the promotion company exists to "(I) produce and promote MMA events; (2) to reap the 
benefits of the live and recorded broadcast of such events through all forms of media; and (3) 
to monetize the manufacture and distribution of products relating to the produced and pro-
moted events." I d. On the other hand, the agreement is also made up of numerous provisions 
that specifically explain the rights and responsibilities of the fighter, including allocation of 
expenses and insurance costs. Jd. Originally, both the fighter expenses and insurance provi-
sions were written to heavily favor the promotion company. Jd. They only took into account 
expenses and insurance necessary during the course of the event that was being promoted. I d. 
Fight related expenses are generally covered, including flight, hotel, and per-diem food al-
lowances for the fighter and his cornermen. Jd. The fighter is responsible for all other non-
fight related costs in the course of his training and preparation. !d. Originally, the promotion 
company would provide the fighter with health and accidental death insurance, but only 
during the actual event. ld. The clause was extremely narrow and explained that the fighters 
were still personally responsible for their own medical expenses. ld. Recently, however, 
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provision binds the fighter to a restricted relationship with the UFC for an 
agreed upon term and specified number of fights. 56 Regardless of the term 
length in the agreement, the provision includes various termination and ex-
tension clauses that can be triggered at the promoter's discretion.57 One of 
the most controversial extension clauses is the "Champion's Clause," which 
allows the promoter to extend the contract if the fighter wins a champion-
ship belt during the original term.58 The "Retirement Clause" is often in-
voked only for top fighters seeking retirement, and it gives the UFC power 
"to retain the rights to a retired fighter in perpetuity."59 Finally, the Ancil-
lary Rights Agreement itself is not an extension provision, but rather a life-
Zuffa began providing insurance policies for its fighters. Luan Madani, UFC: Zuffa Offering 
Insurance to Fighters and How lt Furthers the Sport, BLEACHER REP. (May 19, 20II), 
http:/lbleacherreport.com/articles/705950-ufc-zuffa-offering-insurance-to-fighters-and-how-
it-furthers-the-sport. The creation of the insurance policy was an enormous step toward con-
tinued legitimization of the sport because the policy covers all UFC and Strikeforce fighters 
at no additional cost. !d. The fighters may use up to $50,000 in coverage per year even if 
they are not scheduled to fight in the near future. !d. As long as the fighter is under contract 
with Zuffa, the policy covers dental and life insurance, "doctor services, laboratory tests, 
emergency medical evacuation and physical therapy." !d. Contracting fighters will now be 
covered for injuries suffered during an event or throughout the course of training. !d. 
56. Wimsett, supra note 54. 
57. !d. 
58. !d.; Kelsey Philpott, Anderson Silva Looking to Avoid "UFC Champion" 
Clause?, MMA PAYOUT (Aug. II, 2009), http://mmapayout.com/2009/08/anderson-silva-
looking-to-avoid-ufc-champions-clause [hereinafter Philpott, Anderson Silva]. The UFC's 
Champion's Clause states: 
[I]f, at the expiration of the Term, Fighter is then UFC champion, the Term shall be 
automatically extended for a period commencing on the Termination Date and end-
ing on the earlier of (i) one (I) year from the Termination Date; or (ii) the date on 
which Fighter has participated in three (3) bouts promoted by ZUFF A following 
the Termination Date ("Extension Term"). Any references to the Term herein shall 
be deemed to include a reference the Extension Term, where applicable. 
Kelsey Philpott, The Champion's Clause: An MMA Comparative, MMA PAYOUT (Sept. 7, 
2009), http:l/mmapayout.com/2009/09/the-champions-clause-an-mma-comparative [herein-
after Philpott, Champion's Clause]. 
59. Adam Swift, Inside the Standard Zuffa Contract, SHERDOG (Oct. 31, 2007), 
http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles/Inside-the-Standard-Zuffa-Contract-9734. The Re-
tirement Clause states: 
If at any time during the Term, Fighter decides to retire from mixed martial arts or 
other professional fighting competition, then ZUFFA may, at its election, (i) sus-
pend the Term for the period of such retirement; (ii) declare that ZUFF A has satis-
fied its obligation to promote all future Bouts to be promoted by ZUFF A hereun-
der, without any compensation due to Fighter therefore; or (iii) elect to provide 
Fighter with notice of an Acceleration. 
!d. Sub clause (i), which allows the UFC to indefinitely suspend the term, is generally re-
served for top fighters. See id. 
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time agreement that requires the fighter to sign over rights to his "name, 
sobriquet, voice, persona, signature, likeness and/or biography."60 
Standard form Zuffa contracts are undoubtedly written to favor the 
UFC.61 With far superior bargaining power, the promoter uses these agree-
ments to control the contractual relationship with its fighters, while exploit-
ing those athletes in a number of significant ways.62 Some of the most bla-
tant forms of exploitation involve extending contractual terms, terminating 
contracts, and forcing fighters to agree to terms requiring the indefinite for-
feiture of their personal and professional rights. 63 
The UFC regularly uses broad termination provisions to end many 
agreements and drop fighters for any number of reasons.64 For instance, the 
UFC may terminate a fighter's contract for a loss, failed drug test, medical 
suspension, or wearing of an unapproved sponsor's logo on a T -shirt during 
weigh-ins.65 The UFC terminated fighter Matt Lindland's contract after 
three consecutive wins, claiming that he showed a conflict of interest and 
breached his contract when he wore an unapproved T -shirt during weigh-
ins. 66 According to Lindland, who was a top contender in the middleweight 
division, there must have been other motives for his termination because 
other fighters had similarly unapproved sponsors, but they were not tenni-
nated.67 Nonetheless, the UFC stuck by its decision to make an example out 
ofLindland and refused to renegotiate a new contract with him.68 
The Champion's Clause is one of the most contentious extension pro-
visions used to exploit MMA fighters.69 The main purpose of the clause is to 
prevent the most talented fighters from leaving and joining alternative 
leagues.70 Also, the clause limits the amount of bargaining power a fighter 
60. David Nelmark, Intellectual Property Rights Under the Zuffa Standard Con-
tract, MMA PAYOUT (July 16, 2009), http://mmapayout.com/2009/07/intellectual-property-
rights-under-the-zuffa-standard-contract (listing the general rights that a fighter must give up 
when he signs the contract). 
61. Swift, supra note 59. 
62. /d. 
63. !d. 
64. Wimsett, supra note 54. 
65. !d.; Eric Foster, Matt Lind/and: UFC Refuses to Negotiate New Deal, 
MMAJUNKIE.COM (Feb. 15, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://mmajunkie.com/news/3750/matt-
lindland-ufc-refuses-to-negotiate-new-deal.mma. 
66. See Foster, supra note 65; Scott Dryden, The Triangle Choke: Matt Lind/and 
Interview, PROFIGHTING-FANS.COM, http://www.profighting-fans.com/articles/matt-lindland-
interview_Ol0609.htrnl (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
67. Foster, supra note 65. 
68. !d. 
69. See Philpott, Anderson Silva, supra note 58; Philpott, Champion's Clause, supra 
note 58. 
70. Philpott, Champion's Clause, supra note 58 ("[T]hey're 'self-fulfilling' talent 
retention mechanisms."). 
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may gain while he holds a championship belt.71 Journalists who are familiar 
with MMA contracts have raised concerns regarding the issue of whether 
the clause would allow the UFC to extend the contract indefinitely if the 
fighter holds a championship belt at the end of each subsequently extended 
term.72 At one point, Anderson Silva, a UFC middleweight champion, want-
ed to abandon his championship belt and move to a new weight class. 73 Ru-
mors quickly spread that Silva's actions centered on a desire to leave the 
UFC at the end of his contract term to compete against boxing champion 
Roy Jones, Jr. in a boxing match.74 Regardless of his true motivation, Sil-
va's contract would have been automatically extended if he held his mid-
dleweight belt at the end of his agreed-upon term.75 In such a situation, Silva 
would not be able to compete outside the UFC without first breaching his 
contract.16 
Similarly, the UFC has opportunistically used the Retirement Clause 
against some of the sport's most respected and legendary fighters. 77 For top 
fighters seeking retirement, this provision gives the UFC the power to sus-
pend the contract term for the entire period of the fighter's retirement. 78 In 
2007, heavyweight champion Randy Couture, one of the most successful 
MMA fighters in the history of the sport, decided to depart from the UFC 
with two fights remaining on his contract. 79 Couture opted to leave the UFC 
when he realized he would not be able to fight Fedor Emelianenko, arguably 
the world's greatest fighter, as a member in the UFC.80 The main reason 
Couture left the UFC, however, was because he perceived the UFC to lack 
any respect for its fighters generally or for Couture specifically.81 In re-
71. !d. 
72. !d. The clause would likely be interpreted to mean that the UFC is limited to 
extending the contract term for either one year or three bouts. !d. If, however, "Term" is 
interpreted to include "Extension Term," then it is possible to conclude that the UFC holds 
the power to continuously extend the contract if the fighter holds a championship belt at the 
end of the original term and each subsequent extended term. !d. 
73. Philpott, Anderson Silva, supra note 58. 
74. !d. 
75. !d. 
76. See id. 
77. See Swift, supra note 59. 
78. !d. 
79. !d. Couture decided to resign because he felt there was no one meaningful left 
for him to fight. Kevin I ole, Couture Stuns MMA World with Retirement, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Oct. II, 2007), http://sports.yahoo.com/box/news?slug=ki-couture!OII07. Couture was 
hoping to fight Fedor Emelianenko, but Couture resigned as soon as he heard that Eme-
lianenko signed with a different promotion company. !d. 
80. Josh Gross, Update: Couture Talks UFC Resignation, SHERDOG (Oct. II, 2007), 
http://www.sherdog.com/news/news/Update-Couture-Talks-UFC-Resignation-9455. 
81. /d. ("'I'm tired of being taken advantage of, played as the nice guy and basically 
swimming against the current with the management of the UFC .... I don't need the prob-
lems. I don't feel like I get the respect I deserve from the organization."' (quoting Randy 
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sponse to Couture's resignation, the UFC elected to suspend the term of the 
exclusivity agreement for the extent of Couture's retirement.82 UFC Presi-
dent Dana White claimed that Couture owed the UFC two more fights under 
his contract, while Couture argued that the contract ended at the conclusion 
of its eighteen-month termY After the UFC filed a lawsuit against Couture 
for damages suffered as a result of statements that he made about the com-
pany, the two parties came to an agreement, and Couture returned to the 
UFC.84 
Finally, the Ancillary Rights Agreement is the most controversial pro-
vision of the UFC standard form contract.85 As noted above, the UFC termi-
nated Jon Fitch's contract when he attempted to negotiate a ten-year limit 
on the scope of this term. 86 Once a fighter signs over these rights, he gives 
the UFC the perpetual and exclusive power to use them in any way it sees 
fit, including sublicensing the fighter's rights to a third party.87 The hard-
ships imposed by the Ancillary Rights Agreement are most obvious with 
respect to new fighters who sign with the UFC for an undercard bout in 
hopes of rising in the ranks of the promotion. 88 Although a single loss could 
allow the UFC to terminate the contract, the promotional agreement would 
still be in effect permanently.89 The provision, therefore, allows the UFC to 
prevent a fighter from taking part in any self-promotion even after his career 
Couture)). Further, he explained that Dana White and Lorenzo Fertitta lied to him when they 
told him he was the number two paid athlete in the UFC. !d. Couture knew it was a lie be-
cause the UFC offered Emelianenko more for a signing bonus than Couture had ever been 
awarded for a fight. Jeff Cain, Why Randy Couture Left the UFC, MMA WKLY. (Oct. 25, 
2007), http://mmaweekly.com/why-randy-couture-left-the-ufc-2. White told Couture that he 
controls him. !d. In a press conference, Couture expressed that the UFC paid fighters with 
bonuses "off-the-books," that it did not pay him a negotiated signing bonus, and that it mis-
treated many of its fighters. Adam Hill, Couture Is Target ofUFC Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J. (Jan. 26, 2009, 4:57 PM), http://www.lvrj.com/sports/13794082.html. To refute Couture's 
claims, the UFC produced financial documents to show that they paid out more money to 
Couture than he alleged in his previous press conference. UFC Disputes Couture's Claims 
About His Pay, MMA WKLY. (Oct. 30, 2007), http://mmaweekly.com/ufc-disputes-coutures-
claims-about-his-pay-2. 
82. Adam Swift, Cuban's HDNet Fights Enters Couture-UFC War, SHERDOG (Feb. 
15, 2008), http://www.sherdog.com/news/articles/Cubans-HDNet-Fights-Enters-Couture-
UFC-War-11346. 
83. Cain, supra note 81. 
84. See Christopher Bean, Randy Couture: The Natural leon, PROFIGHTING-
F ANS.COM, http:/ /www.profighting-fans.com/articles/randy-couture-the-natural_ 01 0312.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
85. Nelmark, supra note 60. 
86. See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text. 
87. Nelmark, supra note 60. 
88. Jd. 
89. Id. 
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with the promoter is complete.9° Further, a separate clause in the agreement 
prevents a subjected fighter from ever referring to himself as a "UFC fight-
er" or "using the term 'UFC' without written permission.'091 
The exclusive fighter agreements are filled with broad and controlling 
language, giving the promoter numerous rights and privileges that the fight-
er cannot negotiate if he has any hope of being in the UFC.92 Although the 
contract gives the promotion company a wide range of privileges, the UFC 
will not necessarily enforce all of the privileges in every situation.93 Still, 
there is the chance that a court could fmd certain provisions within the con-
tract unconscionable.94 In that event, the promoter has covered itself with a 
severability clause.95 Even though the contracts are heavily one-sided, a 
single fighter has no leverage to negotiate the terms, because there are thou-
sands of others who are willing to sign anything for a chance to fight in the 
UFC.96 
II. COERCIVE CONTRACTS IN OTHER SPORTS AND INDUSTRIES 
MMA has gained popularity faster than any other sport in history, but 
if the UFC does not address its issues with coercive exclusive agreements, 
fighters may take part in disruptive reform attempts following the path of 
many other sports and industries.97 Reform efforts in similarly structured 
sports and industries provide potential models for fighters seeking solutions 
to contract inequities.98 Though it may not be possible to completely satisfy 
90. /d. (noting that, in theory, "the UFC can ... prevent you from being in a movie, 
making an action figure, doing a sports drink commercial, or even creating a website with a 
URL that uses your name"). 
91. !d. 
92. See Swift, supra note 59. 
93. Nelmark, supra note 60. 
94. !d. 
95. Swift, supra note 59 ("[I]f any part of the contract is found to be 'illegal, invalid, 
or unenforceable as to any circumstance,' the entire contract would not be void as a result."). 
96. Nelmark, supra note 60. 
97. See generally Steven Marrocco, UFC Exec Lorenzo Fertitta on Potential Fight-
ers Union: "That's Up to Them," MMAJUNKIE.COM (June 4, 2010, 8:45 AM), 
http://mmajunkie.com/news/1941 0/ufc-exec-lorenzo-fertitta-on-potential-fighters-union-
thats-up-to-them.mma (discussing the possibility of fighters forming a union in response to 
disputes between fighters and the promotion company). Sports have been plagued with re-
form attempts that cost the leagues dearly in terms of fan support and revenues. Daniel 
Bukszpan, 10 Game-Changing Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes, CNBC.COM (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41968930/IO_Game_Changing_Pro_Sports_Lockouts_and_Strikes 
(explaining how strikes in Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the Nation-
al Hockey League, and the National Basketball Association had negative impacts on the 
respective sports). 
98. See infra Sections II.A-D. 
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all parties, greater awareness may highlight viable options for fighters while 
preventing the sport from progressing in the wrong direction.99 
Similar to MMA, many other sports and industries operated, or still 
operate, on one-sided agreements. 10° For example, the origins of profession-
al boxing, tennis, football, auto racing, and the entertainment industry are 
mired in a history of enforcing one-sided contracts. 101 Each of these sports 
and industries share similarities with MMA and can therefore provide a 
basic analysis of bargaining structure and contract reform. 
A. NASCAR's Absolute Control over the Automotive Racing Industry 
Much like the UFC's current structure, the National Association for 
Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) uses a business plan that revolves 
around sanctioning and promoting events because it does not own racecars, 
racetracks, or drivers. 102 NASCAR has a unique legal structure that allows 
the organization to exercise strict control over all of its contracted drivers. 103 
It is a privately owned corporation, like the UFC, and is controlled by Bill 
France and his family. 104 From its inception, auto racing grew in popularity, 
and NASCAR continued to gain power under its "'benevolent dictator-
99. See infra Sections II.A-D. 
100. See infra Sections II.A-D. 
101. See generally Kevin W. Wells, Labor Relations in the National Football 
League: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 93, 96 (2011) (discussing the 
history of labor relations in the National Football League and the players' union); Rick 
Smith, Note, Here's Why Hollywood Should Kiss the Handshake Deal Goodbye, 23 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REv. 503, 506-08 (2003) (explaining the power that movie production compa-
nies have over all actors and actresses, and stating that there is little room for negotiation); S. 
Joseph Modric, The Good Ole' Boys: Antitrust Issues in America's Largest Spectator Sport, 
1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 162 (2003) (detailing the structure of 
NASCAR as a private corporation that has strict control over all of its participants); Melissa 
Bell, Time to Give Boxers a Fighting Chance: The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 10 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 473, 482 (2000) (explaining the coercive nature of boxing 
contracts); How It All Began, ATP WORLD ToUR, http://www.atpworldtour.com/Corporate/ 
History.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (noting that the Association of Tennis Professionals 
was formed when the athletes recognized their need for a players' association). 
102. Modric, supra note 101, at 161. 
103. !d. at 162. 
104. !d. NASCAR was founded on February 21, 1948, in Daytona Beach, Florida. !d. 
at 161. In 1949, France sought to distinguish NASCAR from other stock car racing organiza-
tions, so he sanctioned the first "strictly stock" car race that featured production model cars. 
!d. The use of production model cars differed from other sanctioning organizations that pro-
moted races with modified old model racecars. !d. France's race among production model 
cars laid out the framework for the model stock car racing industry. !d. 
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ship. "'105 Under a totalitarian framework, NASCAR has maintained com-
plete control over everything that is affiliated with the organization. 106 
As a result of its increased power in the racing industry, NASCAR 
maintains complete control over its participants by enforcing strict punish-
ments against anyone who attempts to challenge the organization. 107 For 
instance, the NASCAR organization once punished certain drivers by refus-
ing to let them participate in a race when it subjectively determined that the 
drivers took part in '"actions detrimental to auto racing.'"108 Specific rules 
are outlined in NASCAR's rulebook, but the organization exercises great 
discretion in determining punishments based on the popularity of the driver 
or value of the corporate sponsor. 109 
NASCAR thwarted drivers' attempts to gain more power over the or-
ganization through unionization. 110 The first attempt to form a drivers' union 
resulted in NASCAR banning the only two union members from the 
sport.'" Another effort to unionize took place in 1969, when the newly 
formed Professional Drivers' Association (PDA) staged a boycott for safety 
concerns at the Talladega 500. 112 As a result, NASCAR brought in over thir-
ty substitute teams to replace the boycotting drivers, and it allowed ticket 
holders to exchange their ticket for admission to a future event. 113 Following 
the boycott, NASCAR included a '"good faith to the public pledge"' in all 
of its entry forms. 114 The "pledge" increased NASCAR' s control over its 
drivers by requiring them to obtain both a substitute driver and written ap-
proval from a director before they could withdraw from a race. 115 Eventual-
ly, NASCAR's control and financial influence from corporate sponsors de-
stroyed the PDA. 116 
NASCAR's absolute control over its participants raises antitrust is-
sues. 117 Still, there are likely many reasons why antitrust claims remain non-
105. !d. (quoting MARK D. HOWELL, FROM MOONSHINE TO MADISON AVENUE: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE NASCAR WINSTON CUP SERIES 16 (1997)) (explaining the over-
arching control that NASCAR management has over all of its drivers). 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 162. 
108. /d. (quoting HOWELL, supra note 105, at 23). NASCAR also emphasized the 
importance of loyalty within the organization when it punished drivers for competing in non-
NASCAR sanctioned events. Id. at 163. 
109. !d. at 162. 
110. /d. at 163. 
Ill. /d. at 164. 
112. /d. at 164-65. 
113. /d. at 165. 
114. Jd. (quoting HOWELL, supra note 105, at 46). 
115. Id. 
116. See id. 
117. !d. at 170. 
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existent in NASCAR. 118 The most likely reason is that participants fear the 
organization's reputation for using extreme punishment in response to op-
position and dissent. 119 
Nevertheless, one potential violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
could arise from NASCAR's organizational decisions and subjective en-
forcement of its rules. 120 The organization could face liability if it continues 
to change its rules unilaterally and arbitrarily, especially when it comes to 
safety issues. 121 In such a scenario, liability would be based on a Rule of 
Reason violation of Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 122 Another po-
tential issue for liability could stem from NASCAR's monopolization of the 
stock car racing industry. 123 Under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a 
violation could exist if a court determined that NASCAR possessed a mo-
nopoly power over the stock car racing industry and that it willfully ac-
quired that power. 124 Based on NASCAR's absolute control that spreads 
across the geographic product market, a monopolization claim would likely 
be successful. 125 
While NASCAR enjoys absolute control over the stock car racing in-
dustry, a court could still potentially find that NASCAR operates in viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 126 As a result, the organization must con-
tinue to operate in a manner that keeps its participants relatively content. 127 
It appears, however, that the organization will be safe as long as it maintains 
its reputation for strict punishment against opposition. 128 
B. Federal Regulation over Coercive Boxing Contracts 
Boxing and MMA are two combat sports that share a number of simi-
larities in terms of history, state regulation, and the lack of a governing 
118. !d. Some potential reasons may be that "teams act as a family" or that sponsors 
settle disputes before they escalate. !d. Also, participants may recognize that the structure has 
worked for years and they do not want to disrupt it. !d. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at 175; Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (2006). 
121. Modric,supranote 101, at 175. 
122. 15 U.S.C. § I. A Rule of Reason determination is based on a totality of the cir-
cumstances test that measures whether the questioned business practices promote or suppress 
market competition. Antitrust: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). A violation occurs when 
the business practice unfairly suppresses market competition. !d. 
123. Modric, supra note 101, at 176. 
124. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
125. Modric,supranote IOI,at 177-78. 
126. !d. at 178. 
127. See id. 
128. !d. at 170 ("[P]erhaps most likely, NASCAR's participants still fear the organi-
zation's wrath."). 
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body. 129 Most importantly, boxers were historically exploited because of 
their inability to protect their own rights and interests when contracting with 
managers and promoters. 13° Current MMA fighters face the same disparities 
and coercive relationships that boxers have dealt with for years. 131 
Similar to MMA, the boxing industry does not have an independent 
governing body, and there is no legitimate boxers' association or union to 
represent the boxers. 132 Originally, the average boxer did not have adequate 
bargaining power, but he was still required to sign a contract with a promot-
er if he ever wanted to compete. 133 However, the entire boxing industry is 
notorious for being filled with corruption, secret deals, and coercive con-
tracts.134 
Boxers sign a contract with a manager, who then signs additional con-
tracts with promoters that then actually organize the fights. 135 Once signed 
to an exclusive contract, the boxer may only participate in fights that the 
promoter has arranged. 136 Thus, the business structure gives the promoter an 
immense amount of power and control over the boxer's entire career. 137 Ra-
ther than seeking the best possible fight for the boxer, the promoter has a 
much greater incentive to earn as much profit as possible. 138 Unfortunately, 
this reality means that the promoter is more likely to promote a fight be-
tween two fighters that are contracting with him, regardless of comparative 
skill level. 139 Prior to regulation, boxers were therefore more likely to sign 
with a promoter who held contracts with the greatest number of relevant 
fighters, which in tum only increased the promoter's power. 140 Promoters 
129. Varney, supra note 50, at 295 ("Both can trace their history to the ancient 
Olympics, both are regulated by the state athletic commissions, and neither have a central-
ized league or governing body regulating the sport."). 
130. !d.; Bell, supra note 101, at 482. 
131. Varney, supra note 50, at 295. 
132. Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab at 
Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2264 (2000). 
Most of the major sports have a single governing body "that handles the day-to-day opera-
tions of the sport and 'provides for the planning, supervision, and control of corporate enter-
prise decisions."' /d. (quoting PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR 
RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 8 (3d ed. 1996)). Independent governing organizations 
establish a unified set of rules for all competitors, and they maintain the general welfare of 
competitors and teams in order to increase public confidence in the sport. !d. at 2265. 
133. !d. at 2269. 
134. See Bell, supra note 101, at 482. 
135. Arlin R. Crisco, Note, Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to the 
Continued Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1144, 1147 
(1999). 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
!d. at 1147. 
!d. 
!d. at 1147-48. 
!d. at 1147. 
140. See id. at 1148. 
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held a direct relationship with managers, which created financial incentives 
for both to find ways to use the boxers for as much profit as possible. 141 
In the past, powerful fight promoters basically controlled the entire 
boxing industry, and the disparities in bargaining power allowed them to 
offer boxing contracts that virtually eliminated any risk for the promoter. 142 
The contracts often contained provisions that allowed the promoter to sign 
the boxer for an indefinite period of time and then extend the term at wil1. 143 
Such a provision automatically limited a new boxer's bargaining power and 
forced him to stay under his initial contract for a term of two to four years, 
regardless of success. 144 If the new boxer then became successful, he would 
not be allowed to renegotiate his contract at the end of the initial term be-
cause the automatic extension provision would keep him under his initial 
contract for "the entire title reign plus two years beyond the date that the 
boxer los[t] the title."145 
Additionally, promoters attempted to gain complete control over box-
ers by choosing a third party to serve as the manager or by forcing the fight-
er to represent himself and agree to all contract terms. 146 Much like athletes 
who want to fight in the UFC, the boxers did not have a choice other than to 
agree to the terms of one-sided contracts because promoters could easily 
refuse to promote or let them fight. 147 As a result of the coercive nature of 
boxing contracts, fight promoters were able to dictate a fighter's entire ca-
reer based on subjective preferences. 148 
Boxers had little recourse available to combat the oppression from 
their promoters. 149 Some filed lawsuits, but most were either quickly settled 
or dismissed because plaintiff boxers could not afford to pay litigation costs 
or put their careers in jeopardy for a number of years. 150 Also, courts were 
generally reluctant or unable to provide redress for the boxers' claims in the 
141. Bell, supra note 101, at 483. 
142. See Baglio, supra note 132, at 2269. Promoters even used their power to control 
the sanctioning committees that were in charge of ranking boxers to determine the best pos-
sible match-ups. Bell, supra note 101, at 483. The rankings were mainly subjective and were 
often determined based on personal preferences and influence from powerful promoters. See 
Crisco, supra note 135, at 1152-53. Thus, the sanctioning committee administrators had all 
the power to give preferred fighters title shots and bigger paychecks, rather than basing the 
determination on an objective skill rating. /d. 
143. Baglio, supra note 132, at 2269. 
144. /d. 
145. /d. 
146. /d. at 2271. 
147. /d. 
148. See id. at 2272-73. 
149. /d. at 2273. 
150. /d. 
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lawsuits that did make it to trial. 151 Historically, courts dismissed uncon-
scionability claims against promoters because boxers were unable to show 
"deceptive or high-pressure tactics."152 As a result of the complete control 
promoters held over the boxing industry, they had the ability to offer con-
tracts to boxers with any preferred terms; the boxers were forced to accept 
those terms if they wanted a chance to fight. 153 
In 1996, Congress passed the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act 
(Reform Act) to combat the oppressive nature of the contractual relation-
ships within the boxing industry. 154 The Reform Act is an amendment to the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 (Safety Act). 155 The Safety Act es-
tablished minimum health and safety standards for the boxing industry, 
whereas Congress passed the Reform Act to establish minimum safety re-
quirements for boxers outside of the ring.156 A predominant purpose of the 
Reform Act was to protect boxers from the promoters' unethical business 
practices and coercive contracts. 157 One section of the Reform Act explicitly 
protects the boxer from coercive contracts. 158 That section was meant to 
151. ld. at 2273-74; see also Trinidad v. King, No. 98 CIV. 4518(LMM), 1998 WL 
823653, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998). In Trinidad, promoter Don King entered into a 
contractual relationship with International Boxing Federation world welterweight champion 
Felix Trinidad. 1998 WL 823653, at *I. When the four-year term elapsed, Trinidad claimed 
that the contract expired, while King argued that he still held exclusive rights over the boxer 
for the reign of his title plus two years. ld. Trinidad sought a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion so he could contract with another promoter. ld. In his motion, he argued that ambiguous 
terms must be interpreted against the drafting party. ld. at *9. The court said he did not show 
a likelihood of success on the merits, but he presented questions of fact that could be an-
swered at trial.ld. at *9-10. Rather than continue with litigation, wasting time and money, he 
agreed to remain under contract with King so that he could continue to fight. Baglio, supra 
note 132, at 2274. 
152. Baglio, supra note 132, at 2274; see also Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 
F. Supp. 778, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Douglas, heavyweight champion James Douglas 
claimed that his promotional contract with Don King should have been declared void be-
cause King had such control over promotion of the weight class that Douglas had no choice 
but to sign a contract with him. 742 F. Supp. at 780. Thus, Douglas claimed he was forced to 
sign the contract with any terms that King wanted. See id. The court opined that "[w]ithout 
some definite allegation of a defect in the contract negotiation process apart from King's 
stature in the boxing field, which alone does not suggest 'inequality so strong and manifest as 
to shock the conscience and confound the judgment,"' Douglas did not make the required 
showing of unconscionability in the bargaining process. ld. at 781 (quoting Christian v. 
Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849,855 (N.Y. 1977)). 
153. Baglio, supra note 132, at 2275. 
154. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6302 (2006). 
155. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
156. See Cristina E. Groschel, Note, Down for the Count: The Muhammad Ali Boxing 
Reform Act and Its Shortcomings, 26 NOVA L. REV. 927, 939 (2002). 
!57. Bell, supra note 10 I, at 485. 
158. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act § 6307b. Definition of a coercive provi-
s10n: 
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prevent promoters from having the ability to force boxers into long-term 
contracts as a condition ofbeing granted a fight. 159 
Still, the Reform Act did not recognize illegal action when promoters 
urged boxers to enter into the coercive contracts; it simply made the con-
tracts unenforceable. 160 Thus, the Reform Act is only effective when a boxer 
brings an issue to court, but history shows that boxers are generally reluc-
tant to waste time and money on fruitless litigation. 161 Even though Con-
gress intended the Reform Act to protect boxers, in certain circumstances it 
only attempts to "impede the business ofpromoters."162 
C. Free Agency in the Entertainment Industry 
The acting business is different from the sport of MMA in many 
ways. 163 Still, actors and fighters are all involved in businesses that are driv-
en by fan support and are plagued by one-sided agreements. 164 The struggle 
between actors and film production studios is representative of the dispute 
between MMA fighters and promoters because the relationships are both 
driven by coercive contracts. 165 
The contracting structure used by Hollywood film industry partici-
pants provides a model that could potentially redress the bargaining power 
[A] contract provision that grants any rights between a boxer and a promoter, or 
between promoters with respect to a boxer, if the boxer is required to grant such 
rights, or a boxer's promoter is required to grant such rights with respect to a boxer 
to another promoter, as a condition precedent to the boxer's participation in a pro-
fessional boxing match against another boxer who is under contract to the promot-
er. 
!d. § 6307b(a)(l)(B). 
159. Groschel, supra note 156, at 940. Don King was notorious for presenting coer-
cive contracts to fighters that he was not even promoting. See Varney, supra note 50, at 290. 
For example, in 1996 King forced boxer Evander Holyfield to sign a coercive agreement 
before he could fight World Boxing Association Heavyweight Champion Mike Tyson, who 
King was promoting. !d. The agreement gave King the rights to promote any challenger who 
won a championship belt from King's own fighter. !d. The Reform Act was meant to combat 
coercive contract terms such as this one, but it still would not completely prevent enforcea-
bility. !d. The Reform Act would only limit the provision to a term of one year in most cir-
cumstances. !d. 
160. Groschel, supra note 156, at 941. 
161. !d. at 941-42; see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
162. Groschel, supra note 156, at 951. 
163. Compare Smith, supra note 101, at 506-08 (describing the Hollywood bargain-
ing structure), with discussion supra Section I.C (describing the basic structure ofMMA and 
the UFC). 
164. See Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of 
Unconscionability, 24 WHIITIER L. REv. 739, 740 (2003); Smith, supra note 101, at 506-07. 
165. Smith, supra note 101, at 506-07. 
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disparities between MMA fighters and the UFC. 166 Bargaining disparities 
are commonplace in Hollywood because of the nature ofthe industry, which 
is similar in many ways to the MMA market. 167 Ten major production studi-
os distribute fewer than half of the total number of films in Hollywood each 
year but still earn more than 95% of all box office revenue. 168 With over 
98,000 actors competing for production projects, the major production stu-
dios, like the UFC, have vast power, and are selective in awarding con-
tracts.169 
Production studios had greater control over actors and actresses when 
Hollywood operated under the studio system. 170 Like the UFC's exclusive 
contract system, the studio system allowed studios to employ actors and 
actresses under long-term exclusive contracts. 171 As employees of a single 
studio, the stars only made movies for that studio, creating an economic 
incentive to make the star as famous as possible. 172 Production companies 
enjoyed enormous profits from the studio system because once the star was 
under contract his or her salary would stay the same even if he or she gained 
popularity from making movies. 173 
The studio system ended in 1944 when actress Olivia de Havilland 
sued her production studio. 174 Production studios used a number of exten-
sion provisions in their contracts that functioned like the Retirement Clause 
and Champion's Clause in a standard UFC contract. 175 For example, produc-
tion studios interpreted contract terms as a period of actual service, rather 
than a term based on calendar years. 176 Thus, the studio based a one-year 
166. Connie Chang, Can't Record Labels and Recording Artists All Just Get Along?: 
The Debate over California Labor Code§ 2855 and Its Impact on the Music Industry, 12 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 13, 14-15 (2002) (discussing free agency in Hollywood and 
how it may be a solution to coercive contracts in other industries, namely the music indus-
try). 
167. Smith, supra note 101, at 506-07. 
168. !d. at 506. 
169. Id. at 506-07 (noting that the actors' union, called the Screen Actors Guild, has 
about 98,000 members but only admits a fraction of the total number of actors seeking em-
ployment in Hollywood). 
170. Note, California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists' Contracts, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2632, 2635 (2003). 
171. James Surowiecki, Hollywood's Star System, at a Cubicle Near You, NEW 
YORKER (May 28, 2001), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/05/28/010528 
talk_ the_ financial _page. 
172. !d. 
173. !d. 
174. See Note, supra note 170, at 2634-35; Tracy C. Gardner, Expanding the Rights 
of Recording Artists: An Argument to Repeal Section 2855(b) of the California Labor Code, 
72 BROOK. L. REv. 721, 729-30 (2007); Chang, supra note 166, at 18-19. 
175. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944); see supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text. 
176. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 985. 
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contract on one year of actual work, which could actually take much longer 
than a single calendar year. 177 De Havilland signed a one-year contract with 
Warner Brothers, but the contract gave the studio the option to suspend the 
contract during periods of inactivity and extend it for six consecutive one-
year terms. 178 Warner Brothers suspended de Havilland's contract for a total 
of twenty-five weeks. 179 The studio then exercised its extension option each 
time and claimed that de Havilland owed twenty-five weeks of service, even 
though the contract would have extended beyond seven calendar years since 
the time she signed the contract. 180 In De Havilland v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, the court opined that California Labor Code Section 2855 did not 
allow personal service contracts to be extended beyond seven calendar 
years. 181 Citing age, health, and familial reasons, the court concluded that 
public policy required contracts for personal services be limited to seven 
calendar years. 182 
The court's interpretation of Section 2855, referred to as the "De 
Havilland Law," brought an end to the studio system and created the free 
agency system for actors and actresses in Hollywood. 183 Under the current 
free agency system, actors and actresses are not restricted to a long-term 
commitment with a single studio. 184 Instead, film stars are now able to sign 
new short-term contracts with any production company for each new pro-
ject, giving them the "reasonable opportunity to receive fair-market com-
pensation for their services."185 In this new era, stars are able to negotiate 
new contracts with the studio of their choice with bargaining power based 
on their own true market value. 186 
The free agency system is less advantageous for the studios because 
they must renegotiate contracts for every new project. 187 Additionally, the 
studio will spend an enormous amount of money promoting a movie and 
increasing the popularity of an actor, while the actor will most likely work 
177. /d. 
178. /d. at 984. The studio had the right to suspend de Havilland if she failed, refused, 
neglected to perform as instructed, or if production continued longer than expected. !d. De 
Havilland's contract was suspended a number of times when she was sick and when she in 
good faith refused roles that "were unsuited to her matured ability." !d. 
179. /d. 
180. !d. 
181. /d. at 987. 
182. /d. at 988. The court also noted that economic and social surroundings establish 
an expectation that "[a]s one grows more experienced and skillful there should be a reasona-
ble opportunity to move upward and to employ his abilities to the best advantage and for the 
highest obtainable compensation." /d. 
183. See Note, supra note 170, at 2635. 
184. !d. at 2650. 
185. !d. 
186. See Gardner, supra note 174, at 731. 
187. See Surowiecki, supra note 171. 
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with a competing studio on his next project. 188 It appears that the free agen-
cy system was an overall victory for the stars in Hollywood. 189 On the other 
hand, free agency does not provide significant bargaining benefits for the 
average actors and actresses who are still trying to break into the industry .190 
Disparities in bargaining power still exist in Hollywood because of the 
extremely large number of actors and actresses compared to the small num-
ber of major production studios. 191 Studios still consistently use "handshake 
deals," which favor the studio over the star and offer the studio a way to 
back out of the deal without repercussion if the production cannot be com-
pleted.192 Actors and actresses often have no choice but to accept such hand: 
shake deals because their reputation and ability to find work will suffer if 
they attempt to argue with the studio. 193 Even Hollywood superstars lack 
unlimited bargaining power because there is no guarantee that their name 
alone will create box-office success for a project. 194 While free agency was a 
step in the right direction, it did not sterilize the coercive nature of Holly-
wood contracts. 195 
D. Players' Associations in American Football and Tennis 
Many athletes in major sports have acquired representation through 
the use of collective bargaining agreements and players' associations. 196 
Collective bargaining agreements between players' associations and league 
management are prevalent in team sports, such as American football, hock-
ey, and basketball. 197 While most athletes in these sports use players' associ-
ations to enter mutually beneficial agreements with management, profes-
188. /d. 
189. See id. 
190. See Smith, supra note 101, at 507. 
191. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. 
192. See Smith, supra note I 0 I, at 508. Handshake deals are oral agreements to enter 
into a contractual relationship at a later point in time. !d. "Studios and producers have the 
financial incentive to remain uncommitted until all of the talent has committed, and view 
paying a particular artist off as a minimal cost in the event that they cancel a production." !d. 
at 508-09 (footnotes omitted). 
193. !d. at 509-10. 
194. /d.at510-II. 
195. See id. at 511-12. 
196. See generally Collective Bargaining in Sports, FORBES.COM, 
http://video.forbes.com/fvn/sportsmoney/collective-bargaining-agreements (last visited Oct. 
5, 2012). Collective bargaining is defined as a "[m]ethod whereby representatives of em-
ployees (unions) and employers negotiate the conditions of employment, normally resulting 
in a written contract setting forth the wages, hours, and other conditions to be observed for a 
stipulated period." BLS Information: Glossary, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htrn#C (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
197. See C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football 
League: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 13 (1997). 
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sional tennis players used their association to break away from management 
to achieve their desired goal. 198 Both models present possible alternatives 
that MMA fighters can pursue to prevent coercive UFC contracts. 199 
1. The National Football League Players' Association 
An analysis of the collective bargaining agreements between players 
and league management in the National Football League (NFL) provides 
another potential method for combating coercive contracts. Before 1956, 
football players in the NFL did not have enough bargaining power to nego-
tiate with league management.200 Like fighters in the UFC, football players 
were forced to agree to contractual terms preferred by management?01 The 
NFL used one-sided contracts containing provisions that allowed manage-
ment to withhold salaries from injured players and prevent players from 
moving throughout the country. 202 
In an effort to gain representation, the football players formed an asso-
ciation in 1956 called the National Football League Players' Association 
(NFLPA).203 Originally, management gave the new union little respect and 
instilled fear in the members. 204 The managers maintained the position that 
players were dispensable, like UFC fighters, and that the game would be 
played without anyone who went on strike.205 As a result, members of the 
union were reluctant to act or make demands through the union, thereby 
allowing management to maintain a strong position.206 
198. See id.; see also How It All Began, supra note 101; Jonathan Snowden, Combat-
ing the UFC Monopoly: Tennis as a Model for Organizing Fighters, BLOODY ELBOW (Mar. 
16, 2011, 7:29 PM), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2011/3/16/2053887/combating-the-ufc-
monopoly-tennis-as-a-model-for-organizing-fighters. 
199. See generally Snowden, supra note 198. 
200. Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, Fumbling Away the Season: Will the 
Expiration of the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of the 2011 Season?, 20 FORDHAM 
lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1419, 1431 (2010). 
201. Jd. 
202. /d. at 1430-31. 
203. /d. Creighton Miller was elected to lead the players in new collective bargaining 
efforts. /d. at 1431. 
204. Id. 
205. Jd. 
206. Id. In fact, the union did not gain any real bargaining power until the Supreme 
Court concluded that the NFL was not immune from antitrust charges. Radovich v. Nat'l 
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 {1957). In Radovich, Bill Radovich, a nose guard for the 
Detroit Lions, brought a player lawsuit against the NFL claiming a breach of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. /d. at 446-48. Radovich argued that the NFL committed a restraint of trade in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act when the league refused to allow him move from 
Detroit to California to take care of an ill family member. /d. at 448-50. The NFL unsuccess-
fully argued that it was immune from antitrust litigation because the Supreme Court previ-
ously opined that Major League Baseball was exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act. I d. at 
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Despite the organized structure of the NFLPA, a collective bargaining 
agreement did not exist until 1968.207 One year later, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) accepted jurisdiction over professional sports to 
prevent unlawful labor practices in athletics.208 Once authorities formally 
recognized the NFLP A as a union, it worked with league management to 
create a four-year agreement to increase minimum salaries for players, im-
prove pension, and provide additional benefits.209 The NFL lost subsequent 
antitrust litigation in 1976, costing the league millions of dollars.210 These 
changes compelled the NFL to negotiate with the NFLP A and initiated a 
system that allowed players and teams to bargain for their contracts.211 
Collective bargaining helps NFL players avoid both one-sided and co-
ercive contracts with the league's owners.212 The players' union designates a 
single representative to bargain on behalf of the football players in the 
league.213 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regulates the collec-
tive bargaining process. 214 Section 157 of the NLRA explains, "Employees 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."215 Inherent in the aforemen-
tioned provision is the requirement that those seeking to unionize are actual 
employees, as opposed to independent contractors.216 Thus, once the em-
451-54. This victory gave the union new bargaining power against the league. Levine & 
Maravent, supra note 200, at 1431. 
207. Goplerud, supra note 197, at 14. 
208. /d. 
209. Wells, supra note 101, at 96. 
210. See Mackey v. Nat'! Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1976), 
aff'g 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.C. Minn. 1975). This case involved a suit against the NFL to 
challenge the Rozelle Rule, which restricted player mobility. /d. at 610-11. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that the Rozelle Rule violated federal anti-
trust law. /d. at 622. 
211. Wells, supra note 101, at 97. 
212. /d. 
213. /d. at 103. 
214. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). The NLRA aims to 
prevent disparities in bargaining power by promoting "the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 
/d. § 151. 
215. /d. § 157. 
216. Stephen S. Zashin, Bodyslam from the Top Rope: Unequal Bargaining Power 
and Professional Wrestling's Failure to Unionize, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. I, 23-
24 (1995). Section 152(3) defines an employee as: 
[A ]ny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer 
... and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or 
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor prac-
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ployee requirement is satisfied, the collective bargaining structure creates a 
requirement for good faith bargaining between the two parties, and it has 
improved the once coercive nature of contracts in the NFL.217 
2. The Players' Association of Tennis Professionals 
Tennis and MMA share similar sport structures, and both have histo-
ries of coercive bargaining.218 Both sports are structured around individuals 
competing against each other, unlike the NFL, which is made up ofteams.219 
Further, the structures in tennis and MMA are made of a relatively small 
number of stars who generate the most revenue. 220 Beneath the most popular 
stars, the majority of the athletes struggle to establish themselves in the 
highly competitive ranking system.221 
Tennis players endured problems with the original structure and gov-
ernance of the sport.222 Only amateurs were allowed to compete in tourna-
ments around the world, and some of the game's top players became frus-
trated with their lack of control. 223 In 1972, the players met in a stairwell at a 
tournament venue and decided they needed to form a players' association.224 
The formation of the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) gave the 
players actual representation on the Men's Tennis Council (MTC), which 
administered the men's circuit.225 The actions taken during this period of 
time brought about general improvements to the structure of the sport. 226 
Still, in 1988, members of the ATP recognized that the sport's govern-
ance was ignoring their input and that they were simply being used.227 The 
players realized they "'[had] no alternative but to organize [their] own 
tice ... but shall not include ... any individual having the status of an independent 
contractor. 
29 u.s.c. § 152(3). 
217. ld. § 158(a)(5); see also Wells, supra note 101, at 104. Collective bargaining is 
defined as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative 
of the employees to ... confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
218. Snowden, supra note 198. 
219. ld. 
220. ld. 
221. ld. 
222. See How It All Began, supra note 101. 
223. See id. 
224. ld. 
225. ld. The MTC was made up of representatives from the International Tennis 
Federation, the A TP, and other global tournament directors. I d. 
226. ld. One such improvement was the introduction of a computer ranking system 
that would objectively create the best matchups between players. I d. 
227. Snowden, supra note 198. 
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tour. "'228 The ATP announced it would pull away from the MTC and form 
its own tour, run completely by the players.229 The ATP was able to con-
vince an overwhelming majority of the top players to join the new tour, 
including eight of the top ten players in the world.230 The players realized 
that they held enough popularity and star power to create their own success-
ful tour. 231 
Many sports and industries have histories of coercive contracts be-
tween managers and the actual talent.232 While some companies thrive on 
the power, others have been forced to change because the talent found a 
way to fight back and level the playing field. 233 It seems that MMA and the 
UFC are following the same path as many of the other sports and industries 
that have already dealt with the contract issue. 234 Thus, the UFC must 
change the way it presents contracts, or the fighters will be able to bring 
their own reform to the system. 235 
Ill. ANALYZING ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR MMA 
If the UFC continues to use exploitative contracts, fighters will have 
numerous options to bring about contract reform.236 The UFC has rightfully 
gained power and control over MMA as a result of its efforts to legitimize 
and popularize the sport throughout the world. 237 Still, fighters are beginning 
to contest the coercive UFC contract, which leads to the conclusion that 
some form of contract regulation is required to continue moving MMA in 
the right direction.238 The potential mechanisms for reform include: allowing 
the UFC to maintain absolute control by potentially bringing an antitrust 
claim; seeking federal regulation over coercive contracts; moving fighters 
into a free agency system; or forming a fighters' association.239 
228. Jim Sami, Players Planning to Leave Council, Form New Circuit, SUN 
SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 1988, http:/ /articles.sun-sentinel.com/1988-08-
31/news/8802200368 _1_atp-tennis-players-joey-rive (quoting Hamilton Jordan, director of 
the ATP). 
229. How It All Began, supra note 101. 
230. Snowden, supra note 198. 
231. Rex Bellamy, VIEWS OF SPORT; Will Men's Tennis Finally Get Its House in 
Order?, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 27, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/sports/views-of-
sport-will-men-s-tennis-finally-get-its-house-in-order.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
232. See discussion supra Part II. 
233. See discussion supra Part II. 
234. See discussion supra Part II. 
235. See Snowden, supra note 198. 
236. See discussion supra Part II. 
237. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. 
238. See generally Leung, supra note 2. 
239. See discussion supra Part I. 
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A. Allowing the UFC to Maintain Absolute Control 
The UFC currently exercises absolute control over its own fighters, 
but the company has grown so much that it essentially controls the majority 
of the MMA industry.240 The current distribution of power is nearly identical 
to the way that NASCAR operates; therefore, following the NASCAR mod-
el would mean doing nothing to bring about reform.241 Similar to Bill France 
and his family, Dana White and the other UFC owners exercise complete 
control over their fighters with little tolerance for opposition.242 France and 
White even use the same rationale for their absolute control, explaining that 
they have the most knowledge about their respective sports and cannot af-
ford to let someone with less expertise come on the scene and change what 
they are trying to do for the sport. 243 Also, NASCAR and the UFC operate 
their businesses similarly as they only promote and sanction events.244 
NASCAR does not own any of the cars, tracks, or drivers, just as the UFC 
does not own any of the fighters or the event venues. 245 Finally, the two cor-
porations maintain control over their contracting parties through strikingly 
similar practices of intimidation and strict demand for cooperation.246 
If the UFC continues to operate with such absolute control, fighters 
may be able to bring antitrust suits like the few NASCAR drivers that tried 
to do so in the past.247 In fact, similar to the potential antitrust claims that 
could be brought against NASCAR, a Las Vegas based culinary union re-
cently attacked the UFC by accusing Zuffa of numerous antitrust viola-
tions.248 Citing the UFC's acquisition of rival organizations and its contrac-
240. See De La Rosa, supra note 51. 
241. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
242. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
243. See Tole, supra note 4 (stating Dana White feels that fighters who want to argue 
over contractual provisions "don't understand what the UFC is trying to do for the sport"); 
Modric, supra note I 0 I, at 162 (explaining how NASCAR uses its control to create "close 
finishes that generate fan interest," leading to increased corporate sponsorship and profitabil-
ity). 
244. See supra notes I 02-06 and accompanying text. 
245. Modric, supra note 101, at 161. 
246. See supra notes I 0-12, I 03-06 and accompanying text. 
24 7. See generally De La Rosa, supra note 51. 
248. Bryanna Fissori, Does UFC's Success Exceed Legal Boundaries? Culinary 
Union Requests FTC Investigation, BOXING INSIDER (Sept. 2, 2011), 
http://www .boxinginsider.com!headlines/does-ufcs-success-exceed-legal-boundaries-
culinary-union-formally-requests-ftc-investigation. The Culinary Union went after Zuffa to 
try to get to co-owners Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta, who own non-unionized Station Casinos. 
/d. The Union represents numerous restaurant and hotel workers and wants to organize the 
Station Casino employees. /d. The Culinary Union has been protesting the Fertitta's casinos 
because they are not unionized, and this was their first attempt to go after the owners through 
a different company. Id.; see also T.M., Ultimate Trust-Busting Championship, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 7, 2011, 6:52 AM), http://www.economist.com!blogs/gametheory/2011/IO/comp eti-
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tual restraints on its fighters, the Culinary Workers Union-Local 226 re-
quested a formal Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation for anti-
competitive dealings.249 In particular, the Union argued contractual provi-
sions such as the Champion's Clause, exclusive negotiation clauses, and the 
Ancillary Rights Agreements caused only anti-competitive dealings.250 
Though the FTC did not fmd any wrongdoing, it is clear that the UFC does 
not have the kind of control over potential legal claims enjoyed by 
NASCAR.251 The UFC may be able to police its fighters and prevent them 
from bringing claims by threatening contract termination, but it is clear that 
the UFC does not have that degree of control over outside forces, such as 
the Culinary Union.252 Unlike NASCAR, the UFC cannot rely solely on 
internal control to prevent potentially lethal legal claims. 253 
Similarly, if fighters allow the UFC to follow in the footsteps of 
NASCAR, they will not be able to find a way to increase representation and 
bargaining power.254 Fighters have already recognized a need to gain repre-
sentation, but if the UFC continues to gain power then there will be little to 
prevent it from thwarting the fighters' attempts to organize, much like 
NASCAR. 255 Thus, if the UFC continues to operate like NASCAR, it will 
continue to exploit fighters, and those fighters will have no choice but to 
accept the UFC's terms in every contractual provision, or else they simply 
will not be given the chance to fight. 256 
Depending on one's viewpoint, strict control on the part of the UFC 
may have potential benefits.257 Clearly, as Dana White has stated numerous 
tion-mixed-martial-arts (discussing the Culinary Union and its attempts to launch an antitrust 
investigation and prevent New York from sanctioning MMA); Culinary Union Accuses UFC 
of "Homophobic" Behaviour, FIGHTERS ONLY (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www. fightersonlymag.com/content/news/13959-culinary-union-accuses-ufc-of-
'homophobic'-behaviour (explaining the Union has taken steps to prove "the UFC product is 
of dubious moral quality" by launching a cite that highlights "expletive-heavy quotes" from 
UFC figures, and attempts to show that the UFC promotes homophobic tendencies based on 
similar quotes). 
249. Fissori, supra note 248. 
250. /d. The FTC ended its investigation in January 2012 after finding no wrongdoing 
on the part of Zuffa. Steven Marrocco, FTC Closes Investigation into UFC/Strikeforce Deal, 
MMAJUNKIE.COM (Jan. 31, 2012, 8:00PM), http:/lmmajunkie.com/news/27219/ftc-closes-
investigation-into-ufcstrikeforce-deal.mma. A Jetter sent to Zuffa lawyers explained that no 
further action was required, but the FTC "'reserve[ d] the right to take such further action as 
the public interest may require."' /d. (quoting letter from FTC Secretary DonaldS. Clark to 
lawyers representing Zuffa and Explosion Entertainment). 
251. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
252. See Marrocco, supra note 250. 
253. See supra notes 1I7-I9 and accompanying text. 
254. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
255. See supra notes II 0-16 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes I 02-06 and accompanying text. 
25 7. See supra notes 14-I7 and accompanying text. 
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times, the UFC knows what it is doing and it knows what action is neces-
sary to help MMA grow.258 The UFC is much like NASCAR in that it has 
made amazing and historic improvements to the sport, and that the UFC is 
far from fmished with bringing MMA to the global main stage. 259 If the 
UFC continued on its path of ultimate control, the sport would go in the 
direction that the owners want it to go, much like NASCAR.260 Fans would 
be happy because they could watch an unlimited number of high-quality 
fights. 261 
Nonetheless, absolute control would not be good for the sport as a 
whole because the UFC is still a business.262 Thus, the UFC will not always 
match up the best fighters if they will not draw a large crowd. 263 Rather, as a 
business the UFC must promote fights that will generate the most reve-
nue.264 Ethics is the essence of sport, and rules are designed to level the 
playing field to showcase the human body and mind at their finest. 265 If the 
UFC continues to exploit its fighters, it will harm the ethics of the sport and, 
thus, the sport overall. 266 
B. Waiting for Congressional Action 
Many MMA figures have expressed the opinion that the sport can, and 
should, be regulated under the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act or simi-
lar congressional action.267 Congress would likely have the constitutional 
authority to regulate the sport in accordance with its powers granted by the 
Commerce Clause.268 Further, the basic frameworks of boxing and MMA, 
and the Reform Act itself, make it a viable method for attempting to reform 
258. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
260. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
261. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
262. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
263. See FIGHTING POLITICS, supra note 44. 
264. !d. 
265. The sport of boxing is a perfect example of what happens when ethics are ig-
nored and corruption takes over. See discussion supra Section II.B. The sport has become 
more irrelevant for a number of reasons, and "[s]o-called major fights are being watched by 
well under 1% of the country." James Foley, Boxing Enters Somewhere Behind Golf: Fixing 
the Sweet Science's Irrelevance in the American Sports Culture, BAD LEFT HOOK (Feb. 14, 
2012, 9:52 PM), http://www.badlefthook.com/20 12/2/14/2798986/boxing-american-
mainstream-sports-culture-analysis. 
266. See generally discussion supra Part I. 
267. See Varney, supra note 50, at 295-96 (noting how various MMA figures realize 
that the Reform Act does not currently apply to their contracts, but it will at some point in the 
future). 
268. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8; Michael R. Daum, Intelligent Defense: A Call for Feder-
al Regulation of Mixed Martial Arts, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 265-66 
(2011). 
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MMA contracts.269 Although the Reform Act was enacted to combat coer-
cive contracts solely in the sport of boxing, minor changes, or a liberal in-
terpretation of ambiguities in the statute, provide an example of how con-
gressional action can reform MMA contracts between fighters and promot-
ers.2?o 
Boxing and MMA share a number of similarities that help draw the 
conclusion that the Reform Act should apply to both sports.271 The UFC's 
continued growth and acquisitions of rival companies have resulted in in-
creased scrutiny once placed on boxing promoters.272 Similarly, Congress 
enacted the Reform Act specifically to police boxing contracts and to keep 
out many of the coercive provisions that now appear in MMA contracts.273 
The Reform Act does not explicitly cover MMA because the sport did 
not gain popularity in America until after Congress passed the Act in 
2000.274 Therefore, the Reform Act does not automatically apply to MMA 
simply because of the similarities between the two sports.275 In fact, in 2008 
the UFC hired a lobbying firm to advocate against applying the Reform Act 
to the sport, arguing that Congress did not consider the MMA when the Act 
was passed. 276 If UFC fighters push for reform, it would not take much to 
change the language of the Reform Act to apply it to MMA contracts.277 
Applying the Reform Act to MMA would be a step in the right direc-
tion toward preventing coercive contracts, but that step alone is not likely to 
be enough.278 As it stands now, the Reform Act provides a basic framework 
for what a fair contract should look like, but boxers seeking redress rarely 
invoke its power.279 The fact remains that the Reform Act does not act as a 
sword to combat illegal contracts; it merely acts as a shield to prevent coer-
269. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
270. Sam Caplan, Mark Cuban Expounds on Ali Act, FIVE OUNCES OF PAIN (Jan. 31, 
2008), http://www. fiveouncesofpain.com/2008/0 I /31 /mark -cuban-expounds-on-ali-act. 
271. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
272. Chris Howie, UFC May Be Subject of FTC Anti-Trust Investigation, MMABA Y 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 20 II), http://mmabaynews.com/taglmuhammad-ali-boxing-reform-act. 
273. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
274. See generally Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S. C. § 6301 (2006). 
275. See T.M., supra note 248. 
276. See Kim Chi Ha, Ultimate Fighting Hires Lobbying Firm, HILL (May 27, 2008, 
I :45 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-Iobbying/3616-ultimate-fighting-hires-Iobbying-firm. 
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck lobbyist Makan Delrahim argues, "Sometimes those types 
of laws can become vehicles for other things, affecting other sports." !d. He explains that 
MMA is different from boxing and was not taken into consideration when the Reform Act 
was enacted, so it "wouldn't make sense to apply the same rules." !d. 
277. See T.M., supra note 248; see also Varney, supra note 50, at 296-99 (giving a 
strong example of what the Reform Act might look like should it be altered to include refer-
ence to MMA). 
278. See Varney, supra note 50, at 304-05. 
279. See id. 
Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential Defenses 1089 
cive boxing contracts from being enforced.280 The main issue is that fighters 
would still have to spend time and money on litigation if they wanted to 
seek redress through an "MMA Reform Act.m81 
Similarly, the Reform Act probably would not even prevent many of 
the problems that fighters run into when dealing with coercive contracts.282 
Fighters have a number of alternatives if they want to fight outside of the 
UFC, but it is clear that the UFC holds the largest amount of competition 
and the greatest chance to achieve success.283 Therefore, the UFC does not 
necessarily need to enforce its contracts to make fighters perform because 
the threat of termination alone is enough to make the fighter submit.284 For 
example, applying the Reform Act would not prevent another fighter like 
Jon Fitch from signing the Ancillary Rights Agreement, because the termi-
nation of his contract was enough to make him realize he could not keep his 
job if he did not follow the demands of the UFC.285 
On the other hand, the Reform Act would likely force the UFC to 
make some changes to its current standard form contract.286 For instance, 
under Section 6307b(a)(l)(B) of the Reform Act, it is likely that a court will 
find the Retirement Clause and Champion's Clause coercive because they 
grant "rights between a [fighter] and a promoter ... as a condition precedent 
to the [fighter's] participation in a professional [MMA event]."287 Thus, the 
two clauses would be "considered to be in restraint of trade, contrary to 
public policy, and unenforceable" if the extension provisions were for a 
period greater than one year.288 Still, there is no guarantee that the Reform 
Act would prevent the list of other issues that fighters must deal with.289 
C. Creating a Free Agency System 
At this point, the UFC uses its own version of the Hollywood studio 
system to develop fighters and profit off of them as much as possible. 290 The 
various extension clauses within UFC contracts are somewhat similar to the 
provisions that allowed production companies to extend contract terms be-
280. See discussion supra Section II. B. 
281. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
282. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
283. See discussion supra Section LB. 
284. See supra Introduction. 
285. See supra Introduction. 
286. See Varney, supra note 50, at 296-99. 
287. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(I)(B) (2006); see 
also Varney, supra note 50, at 289-90. 
288. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(l)(A). 
289. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
290. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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yond what was actually agreed upon.291 If a court were to decide that provi-
sions such as the Retirement Clause and the Champion's Clause could not 
be used to extend the term indefinitely, the result might resemble the effect 
that the De Havilland Law had on the studio system.292 If a similar law ap-
plied to MMA contracts, the effect of the application would be to create a 
free agency system that allows fighters to sign with different promotion 
companies once the agreed upon term expires.293 
There are some major differences between the structure of MMA and 
the structure in Hollywood entertainment.294 First, a single project in Holly-
wood can take years to complete, whereas a single MMA event will take 
place in one night.295 Thus, it is more realistic for actors and actresses to 
have the freedom to sign with a different production company after the 
completion of each project_296 Also, there are a limited number of powerful 
production companies in Hollywood, but there are no promotion companies 
as powerful as the UFC.297 Therefore, fighters do not have a true incentive to 
sign with different promotion companies after each event because the UFC 
is more dominant than any of the other companies.298 Finally, unlike in Hol-
lywood, the MMA industry functions by giving fighters the chance to win a 
championship belt in their respective weight class.299 If fighters were free to 
move among promotion companies, the entire system would be in jeopardy 
and it would be difficult to monitor all of the different championships in 
every league.300 
The reality is likely that a strict application of the free agency model 
would not function in the MMA industry.301 First, if fighters could renegoti-
ate or sign with different companies before the UFC has profited from the 
fighters, then the entire industry would be threatened because promotion 
companies would not have an incentive to promote fighters who do not sign 
contracts with longer terms.302 Also, the free agency model might have the 
291. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
292. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
293. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
294. Compare supra Section I.C (describing UFC contracts), with supra Section II.C 
(describing contracts in Hollywood). 
295. See generally discussion supra Section I.B (discussing UFC Pay-Per-View 
events). 
296. See Note, supra note 170, at 2635. 
297. See discussion supra Sections I.B, II.C. 
298. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
299. See generally notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
300. This is the same problem that is present in the sport of boxing. See Groschel, 
supra note 156, at 934-35. The sport uses a number of different sanctioning organizations 
that create a number of different champions for a single weight class. /d. Thus, many believe 
that the sport is difficult to follow and the sanctioning organizations are to blame. /d. 
301. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text. 
302. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
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same effect as it did in Hollywood by placing a bigger emphasis on star 
power and making it even more difficult for new fighters to break into the 
sport.JoJ 
The free agency model could only work if its function was to limit the 
extension clauses that appear in UFC contracts.304 At this point, the exten-
sion clauses are the only provisions that could keep a fighter from signing 
with another promotion company once his contract ends with the UFC.305 
Thus, if the UFC wanted to keep the fighter after his contract expired, it 
would have to renegotiate with the fighter, as opposed to enforcing a provi-
sion that forces the fighter to stay.306 As a result, fighters would then have 
more bargaining power based on their market value, and they could go 
wherever they found the best deal, without the fear of being trapped by ex-
tension provisions.307 
On its face, it appears that the free agency system would not be an ap-
propriate replacement for the current MMA studio system.308 Because the 
UFC is the most elite MMA promotion company in the industry, most 
fighters ;would not consider fighting for a different company.309 Therefore, a 
free agency model would not create the equality in bargaining power de-
sired by the fighters. 310 Even if a fighter had the ability to bargain with any 
company based on his marketability, the majority of the most successful 
fighters would stay with the UFC because it has the best competition.311 Free 
agency would give the UFC little incentive to change its contractual provi-
sions, and it would be reluctant to sign anyone for a single fight to increase 
his popularity so he can fight with a different promotion the next time.312 
D. Forming a Fighters' Association 
Perhaps the most viable option for curing bargaining disparities in the 
world of MMA is to follow in the steps of the NFL or the ATP and form a 
fighters' association. 313 As one of the most common methods to combat 
bargaining disparities, creating a players' association is widely accepted in 
the sporting world.314 To gain union protection like the NFLPA, fighters 
303. See discussion supra Section II. C. 
304. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
305. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
306. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
307. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
308. See supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text. 
309. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
310. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
311. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
312. See supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text. 
313. See discussion supra Section II.D. 
314. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. 
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would be required to prove that they are considered employees, rather than 
individual contractors.315 On the other hand, fighters could follow the radical 
step that the ATP took and create their own promotion.316 To be successful 
with that option, fighters would need unity and star power.317 Unfortunately, 
creating their own promotion would take a tremendous amount of time be-
cause the UFC owns the likeness of the fighters who are under contract. 318 
1. The Fighters' Union 
As stated above, the structures of football and MMA share a number 
of dissimilarities.319 For example, the team structure in the NFL made it 
much more reasonable for football players to create a union than it would be 
in MMA because the sport is based on individuals.320 Also, fighters would 
need to overcome the big hurdle of classifying themselves as UFC employ-
ees. 321 Some of the most important factors to consider when determining the 
fighters' employment status are control over the right to work in the service 
of another and the terms of the contract. 322 
Employee status may be determined based on the amount of control 
the employer has over the contracting party; thus an agreement to work ex-
clusively for the single employer indicates employee status.323 As evidenced 
by the exclusivity provision in the exclusive fighter agreements, the UFC 
maintains complete control over its fighters and refuses to let them fight for 
other promotion companies.324 The UFC exerts so much control in this as-
pect of the employment relationship that it even extends its exclusivity pro-
vision if a fighter retires prematurely.325 Though not dispositive, the use of 
an exclusivity provision in an employment contract provides evidence that 
the contracting party is an employee instead of an independent contractor.326 
The terms of the contract and relationship between the parties provide 
extremely relevant evidence as to whether the contracting party is seen as an 
315. Zashin, supra note 216, at 23. 
316. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.2. 
317. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.2. 
318. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
319. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.l. 
320. Marrocco, supra note 97. Co-owner Lorenzo Fertitta explained, "They have 
different needs and are (at) different times in their careers, so I'm not sure if [a union] 
works." Id. 
321. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. 
322. See Zashin, supra note 216, at 28 (listing factors relevant to employment status 
as adopted from Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 220(2) (1958) and NLRB v. United Insur-
ance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968)). 
323. /d. at 42. 
324. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
325. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. 
326. See Zashin, supra note 216, at 43. 
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employee or independent contractor.327 Regardless of the label that is placed 
on the contracting party in the terms of the contract, courts will still use the 
entirety of the relationship to determine employment status.328 In terms of 
the standard Zuffa contract, it is likely that the court would be more con-
cerned with the overall control that the promotion company exerts over the 
fighters rather than a label that is spelled out in the contract. 329 Based on the 
totality of the contractual relationship, it seems that a court could consider 
fighters to be employees rather than independent contractors.330 
In the sporting world, unionizing is the most widely accepted method 
of equalizing bargaining power among employers and employees, but it is 
still not a perfect solution.331 Various legal issues and problems arise once a 
group of athletes forms a union.332 The inevitable players' strike is often the 
most obvious and frustrating downside to unionization because it affects the 
players, owners, and fans. 333 Unionizing may not be a perfect solution, but a 
fighters' union may be the best solution to the current bargaining disparities 
amongst the fighters and owners of the promotion companies because it 
would allow fighters to make their own demands and finally earn represen-
tation.334 
2. The Fighters' Rebellion 
The various similarities between MMA and tennis make the ATP 
model an intriguing solution for giving fighters the power to prevent coer-
cive contracts.335 If the fighters formed their own association, they would 
not need to immediately take the drastic measures taken by the ATP.336 In-
stead, the new fighters' association could function like the early ATP and 
work in conjunction with UFC management to make improvements to the 
overall structure and underlying problematic contractual issues.337 If the 
fighters' association found that the UFC continued to fail to make important 
changes, then it could take action like the ATP and form its own promotion, 
based on fighters' needs.338 
327. !d. at 46-47. 
328. See id. 
329. See id. 
330. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. 
331. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.1. 
332. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.1. 
333. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
334. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.l. 
335. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 
336. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.2. 
337. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.2. 
338. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.2. 
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There are potential problems and other considerations that need to be 
considered with this model. As addressed above, the most important issue in 
forming a fighters' association is fighter unity.339 The fighters would need a 
lot of support and a lot of big name fighters to join the association if they 
want bargaining power like the ATP.340 Also, there is no guarantee that the 
sport should go in the direction chosen by the fighters. 341 The UFC has been 
extremely effective in its efforts to legitimize the sport, and it has a clear 
plan for continuing to expand and improve the sport.342 There is no way to 
know how the fighters would change the sport if the power is placed in their 
hands, but there may be enough experienced and well-respected fighters that 
would know what must be done to improve the UFC's shortcomings.343 
If the fighters were able to unify and create their own association, it 
would likely give them the most amount of bargaining power out of all 
available options.344 The UFC would have to sit down and work with the 
fighters as a group, or else it would risk the possibility of losing all of their 
talents.345 Currently, there is enough star power in the UFC to make the pos-
sibility of a separate fighters' promotion company a legitimate threat. 346 
After all, the UFC would have to realize that "[y ]ou cannot promote big 
tournaments without big names."347 
CONCLUSION 
As MMA continues to increase in popularity, fighters will likely con-
tinue to adapt and improve.348 Keeping this in mind, promoters must be will-
ing to evolve to meet the fighters' needs or else they face the risk of being 
taken over by the fighters. 349 The most radical and effective way to bring 
339. See Marrocco, supra note 97. 
340. /d. Fighter Mart Lindland explained, "The fighters [are] all whores; they just 
fight for the biggest purse, and it's going to be tough unless you could somehow get all the 
fighters to agree to something like that." !d. (alteration in original). He also went on to state, 
"There's enough support (for a union), but these guys outside of the cage or outside of the 
ropes are cowards. You know they would not dare stand up to the powers-that-be." !d. 
341. See discussion supra Part I. 
342. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
343. For example, Randy Couture's name constantly comes up in discussions about 
leaders for a potential fighters' association. See Should There Be a Fighter's Union?, MMA 
PAYOUT (Apr. 27, 2011), hrtp://mmapayout.com/2011/04/should-there-be-a-fighters-union. 
Couture is a well-respected, hall of fame fighter who has felt the wrath of the UFC contract. 
See id. He would likely be very persuasive and influential in the role as leader of a fighters' 
association. See id. 
344. See supra notes 335-43 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra notes 335-43 and accompanying text. 
346. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
34 7. Bellamy, supra note 231. 
348. See discussion supra Part I. 
349. See discussion supra Part III. 
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about change is for the fighters to unify into an association and force the 
UFC to listen to their demands or risk losing their talents.350 On the other 
hand, the UFC could take its own steps toward assuring that its contracts 
conform to appropriate standards set forth by other sports and industries.351 
Either way, the UFC needs to loosen the chokehold on its fighters because 
history shows that it cannot hang on forever without someone starting to 
fight back.352 
350. See discussion supra Section III.D. 
351. See discussion supra Part II. 
352. See discussion supra Part II. 
